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Hespondent, v. LESLIE HOBERT
NUNN, Appellant.

[1] Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Evidence.-The
evidence sustained convictions of a physician for prescribing
narcotics for a person not under his treatment for a pathology
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11163) and for prescribing a narcotic
for a person who represented himself to be an addict (Health
& Saf. Code,§ 11164), where it showed that the physician gave
a state narcotics inspector, who represented that he was using
"H" (which in the vernacular meant heroin), prescriptions for
dilaudin and was paid in cash, and that he did not make any
physical examination of the alleged patient and prescribed an
excessive quantity of the drug.
[2] Id.-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Evidence.-In a prosecution of a physician for prescribing narcotics for a person
not under treatment for a pathology and for a person who
represented himself to be an addict (Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 11163, 11164), it was proper to permit a narcotics inspector
to give his opinion that most addictions are caused by criminal
association and not by the medical profession, where such
testimony was offered in rebuttal of defendant's testimony
that he believed the majority of narcotic addictions were produced from using prescriptions for the relief of pain, and
where the inspector had a knowledge of the causes of narcotic
addiction, gained through experience in interviewing addicts
and study, not possessed by the average man.
[3a, 3b] !d.-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Validity of Statute.-Health & Saf. Code, § 11163, prohibiting prescriptions of
narcotics for persons not under treatment for a pathology, is
not unconstitutional as vague, indefinite and uncertain because
of the words "except in the regular practice of his profession,"
since they cover the activity allowed by Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 2137, relating to practice authorized by a physician's certificate, and those parts of Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11161-11571,
which give the physician certain rights with regard to narcotics, and since they are well enough known to enable a
person practicing as a physician and surgeon to understand
and apply them.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, !i 33.
McK. Dig. References:
Poisons, § 15;
§ 14;
[3,5,9,11,12] Poisons,§!J; [4] CriminalLaw,§9; [6] Words and
Phrases; [7, 16] Poisons, § 16; [8] Physicians, § 4; [10] Criminal
Law, §50; [13] Criminttl Law, §410; [14, 15] Criminal Law, §50.
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Prohibition by Law , Validity of Enactment,s.
with tl11• •·•m~titulional r('quirl"·
of d1w prot·e~s ol' l;~w, ilw crime for whieh ,jr;[c!ll1nnt is
must lw cleady dr:lined, hnt it
that the \Hmls u~cd in the statute be well
lu ,,nnhlP tlw~e JWrsons within its
to undi;rstand and
them.
Poisons-Prescribing of Narcotic by Physician-Validity
Statute.,,~HeaUIJ & SaL Code, § ll~l:30,
that a
shall pn'>'erilw, furnish or admini,;ter nareotics only
Caiih he b••liev,;s the
injury or
sueh treatment, is not mwonstitutional as
iJl(JPfinite and urwertain heeause of the words
" sine•; sueh words havn a definite and well--understood
n nd are free from ambiguity.
Words and Phrases-"Good Faith."-The phrase "good faith"
•:ommon usage has a welJ,defined and generaLly understood
ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
honesty of purpose, frP<~dom from intPntion to de,
iraud; gPncrally Hpe11king, it mcnm; bning faithful to one's
or obligation.
[7 Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-TriaL-~In a pros,.,.Htion of u. physieinn for illt>.gal prescriptions of narcotics,
1lw statutes of' the Health and Safety Code wen' not uncon,;t itntionally applied in that state mueotic inspectors were
,diowed to determine whether or not defendant acted "in the
practice of his profession" and in "good faith," where
!he narcotic inspectors testified as to certain facts and defendtestified to otlwrs and the determination was left to the
which believed that the facts were as tPstified to by the
i 11speetors.
[ 8 j Physicians-Statutes and Regulations.-'rhe Legislature has
power to regulate thP practice of a profPssion, such as tho
1ncdieal profe~sion, whieh affects the public hE'alth rmd safety.
[91 Poisons-Illegal Prescriptions of Narcotics-Validity of Statute.--Health & Saf. Code, § 11164, prohibiting prescription of
a nareotic to a person reprpsenting himself to be an addict, is
unt unconstitutional as leaving the subject of who constitutes
an addict to speculation and conjecture, since "addict" is detined by Health & Sa f. Code, § llOOB, as "a p('l'Son who unlaw1'ully usrs, or is addictrd to the unlawful use of, narcotics.''
lOb] Criminal Law-Defenses--Entrapment.--In a prosecution of a physician for illegal prescriptions of narcotics, deSee Cal.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 3; Am.Jur., Physician6 and Surgeons, § 7 et seq.

[
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See CaLJur.2d, Criminal Law, § 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimi,
§§ 335, 336.

C.2d
because
narcotics
name and address,
from the evidence that
in the mind of defendant, and
fact that he was solicited
to comentrapment.
From
while investigat11164, prohibitnarcotics for persons not under treatment
and
are immune from prosecution
WL•~"'"L"' Health
11170, 11170.5, forbidding
obtain or
to obtain narcotics by fraud
a false name or address in connection
of a
and hence a narcotics
w1uu1110 any law when he gives a false name
to buy narcotics from a physician.
!d.-Obtaining Narcotics by Fraud-Accomplices.-Since a
narcotics
is immune from prosecution for giving a
name and address in attempting to buy narcotics from a
he is not an accomplice to the issuance of prescriptions in violation of Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11163, 11164,
vn.wLow'" prescriptions for persons not under treatment for
and to addicts. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
Criminal Law-Evidence--Evidence Obtained by Unlawful
Seizure.-Evidence obtained by a narcotics inspector by giving
a false name and address in attempting to buy narcotics from a
is not inadmissible in a prosecution of such physician as
been obtained by unlawful search and seizure.
Id.-Defenses--Entrapment.-Where an accused has a precriminal intent, the fact that when solicited by a
he commits a crime raises no inference of unlawful
Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment as a matter of law
not established where there is any substantial evidence
which it may be inferred that criminal intent to commit
offense originated in the mind of the accused.
Prescriptions of Narcotics-Instructions.of a physician for illegal prescriptions of nartrial judge did not err in refusing certain of
defendant's requested instructions where he fully, fairly and
advised the jury on each and every material issue
instructions refused were either covered by instrucor were not applicable to the facts.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
and from an order denying a new trial.
Judge. Affirmed.

was convicted
a person not under his
of section 11163 of the Health
also convicted of one count

superior
" State Narcotics
went o the office of defendant, who was
surgeon licensrd to practice in the State of California.
or Shaw entered the
room.
iherrdcfendant came from his private
InShaw said ''I am Dillon,'' and rkfendant
one '\Valter sent 1" 'l'he

·'.Jw'

\l·hir·il he replied that it was "Joe."

Defendallt
hi,; address and was told that H was "2D03 Rodeo
The doctor entered this information on his pn·
card, together with the
Defendant then handed the
, rPquesting him to sign it on
Defendant asked the
which he replied, "I am
means heroin. Defendant said
lllfl3 of the H0alth and Safety Corle
of his profession, no person shan
narcotic to or for
who is not
or eondition
thnn narcotic
in
division.''
] 1164 of the Hoallh nnd SafetY Code
prc·,eril•e for or administer, or ilisppnse n "nnreotir to
himself as such, except as
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prescription for heroin, but I can write for some legitimate
drug like morphine or dilaudid.'' The inspector said that
would be all right.
Defendant then wrote and signed a narcotics prescription
calling for 60 tablets of 1/16 grain dilaudid to be taken one
or two every four hours as needed. Defendant handed the
prescription to the inspector and charged him $20.
On the patient's history card which was received in evidence
there had been filled in "1. Migraine Headache" and "2.
Narcotic Addiction" below the space provided for "Diagnosis.''
On February 11, 1954, at about 2 p. m., Inspector Shaw
went to defendant's home at 99 Las Flores Canyon Road,
Malibu. Defendant was fixing the mail box on his property
by the main road. Inspector Shaw said to defendant "Hello,"
and defendant asked him if he had a pen. The inspector
replied that he did not, and defendant said, "My prescription
books are in the car, but I will have to get my pen."
They both went in separate cars to the house, which was
a short distance from the mail box. At the hom;e defendant
wrote and signed a prescription in a prescription book. Defendant asked for the inspector's address again, and the
inspector said it was 2903 Rodeo Road. Defendant asked
him if 80 tablets would hold him for a week, to which the
inspector replied that they would. The inspector told defendant that he liked that very much, and asked him if he could
come there again the next week. Defendant replied that it
would be all right.
Defendant gave the prescription, which called for 80 1/16
grain tablets of dilaudid, to the inspector, who paid $50 for it.
On February 18, 1954, at about noon, Mr. Shaw drove to
defendant's home in Malibu. Defendant answered the inspector's knock at the door and they both walked out to the car,
where defendant asked Mr. Shaw if 85 tablets would hold
him. The inspector said that it would and that he would
be out of town the next week so he wanted to go to defendant's
office on the 24th of February. Defendant said that would
be all right.
Defendant then wrote and signed a prescription for 85
tablets of 1/16 grain dilaudid and gave it to the inspector,
who paid him $40 for it.
On February 24, 1954, Mr. Shaw went to defendant's office
in West Los Angeles about noon. There the doctor started
to write a prescription and asked him if his address was 2903
Rodeo Road. The inspector said that it was, and the defend-
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that as soon as they got the physical examination
out of the way he could write a prescription for more than
tablets. This was the only time in the various interviews
that there was any mention of the inspector's physical conthe prescription, which called for 85
tablets, and he paid defendant $40
never made any physical examination of Inspeenor did the inspector ever tell defendant that he
any physical ailment other than that he was using heroin.
never at any time told defendant that he suffered from
headaches or any physical ailment, nor was he
this period confined in any medical institution of the
county or city, and he was not under treatment in any
inE:tituti.on for any ailment or for narcotic addiction. He in
fact did not use narcotics.
Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment upon these
JJtj'LtlLu<un

[1] First: That t1~,e evidence was insufficient to support
flu:; verdicts.
This contention is devoid of merit. From the facts set
forth above, the jury was fully justified in believing that
de:!:'en~iartt had on four different occasions violated section
of the Health and Safety Code by prescribing a narcotic
to or for a person not under treatment for a pathology or
other than narcotic addiction. (Of. People v.
¥1/M.J,fi'w.113 Cal.App.2d 804, 807 [6) [249 P.2d 35]; Davis v.
Board of Medica~ Examiners, 108 Cal.App.2d 346, 352
P.2d 78].) Also that defendant had violated the provisions of section 11164 of the Health and Safety Code in that
he had prescribed a narcotic for a person representing himself as a narcotic user. (Of. Davis v. State Board of Medical
JJJfhu~mt'li~ers. 108 Cal.App.2d 346, 350 et seq. [239 P.2d 78].)
Defendant asked Inspector Shaw "What are you usingY"
and the inspector said "I am using H," which in the vernacnlar means heroin. Defendant clearly understood that
meant heroin, which is a contraband drug, because he
answered ''I cannot write a prescription for heroin but I can
for some legitimate drug like morphine or dilaudid.''
then wrote a prescription for dilandid and gave it to the
The eonclmion is inescapable that Inspector Shaw
re]Jre:sented himself to be an addict, that defendant believed he
an addict and prescribed a narcotic for him in a manner
permitted by law.
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evidence.

Defendant contends that
Blanchard was
that most narcotic addicts
his
criminal association and not
the medical
because it was rebuttal of a collateral matter
h"'""•h'" out on cross-examination
the
and was
issues of the triaL
immaterial to
This contention is untenable. Defendant on direct examination testified that he believed on
18 and
24,
that 'Dillon" was
from a
ache for which he had previously taken heroin and might be
an addict, and that he
the narcotic in the belief
that he was properly treating Dillon for a
by relieving his pain.
The People were
in
it would be contended defendant was acting reasonably and in the ordinary
practice of his profession in prescribing the narcotic in the
amounts that he did, since he had no reason to know or
believe that such pathology did not exist but had reason to
believe that it did.
It was therefore appropriate to ask defendant concerning
the reasonableness of his conduct and to bring out in connection with such reasonableness that defendant believed it was
quite possible that a person using narcotics for the relief of a
pain would become addicted to the narcotic. Also that he
believed the majority of narcotic addicts were produced that
way. The deduction could then be made by the jury that
most narcotic addicts suffered from pain for which they had
first taken the narcotics to which they became addicted, and
that it was more likely a person who was addicted would
suffer from a painful pathology. This would support defendant's position that he believed that "Dillon" was suffering
from a painful pathology.
This deduction could reasonably be controverted by showing that it was not true that most addicts are created by the
medical profession through the use of narcotics to relieve
pain.
To forestall such a deduction and not to impeach defendant,
the People properly presented the opinion of Inspector
Blanchard on the subject.
The evidence disclosed that Inspector Blanchard had a
knowledge of· the causes of narcotic addiction, gained through
experience iu interviewing addicts and study, not possessed
by the average man. He thus qualified as an expert and

1

2137 of the Business and Professions Code
's and surgeon's eertifieate authorwhat are known as medical
and to sever or peneand to use any and all
deformio1 her ph,\·siea1 or men tal conditions.''
11161 to 11G71 of the Health and
and sm·r-;Hms certain
to
and
i'c>rtain acts with
and Professions
sections
for reYocation of the certificate of a
and
for ''
conduct'' and
whieh eonstitutt~ unprofessional conduct. The "regular
of his
'' eovers the
allowed by
and tho:-;e parts
the physician
and
as long
which specifiIYhich arc

lcnown to
1w 1·son

'

and apply
Heali h and Safety Code is constitutionaL
Defendant further contends that section 11330 of
tlh• Health and
Code is unconstitutional because the
faith'' i'> too vague, indefinite and uncertain
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to form the basis of a criminal
This section
reads:
"A physician may prescribe for, furnish to, or administer
narcotics to his patient when the patient is suffering from a
disease, ailment, injury, or infirmities attendant upon old
age, other than narcotic addiction.
"The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer narcotics only when in good faith he believes the disease, ailment, injury, or infirmity, requires such treatment.
''The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer
narcotics only in such quantity and for such length of time
as are reasonably necessary.''
A similar contention was made before the Supreme Court
of Illinois in People v. Guagliata, 362 Ill. 427 [200 N.E.
169, 103 A.L.R. 1035]. In disposing of the contention and
holding that the words "good faith" have a common and
generally accepted meaning, the court at page 171 [200 N.E.]
said: ''The words complained against have been defined in
many cases in many jurisdictions. In Crouch v. First Nat.
Bank, 156 Ill. 342 [40 N.E. 974, 979], we said that 'good faith'
means 'honest, lawful intent,' and in McConnel v. Street,
17 Ill. 253, we said that 'good faith' is the 'opposite of fraud
and bad faith.' Numerous cases in other jurisdictions give
substantially similar definitions. A liberal construction should
be given constitutional provisions in order to sustain legislative enactments, and all doubts and uncertainties arising from
the Constitution, as well as the statute, should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the statute. (Citing cases.) The
words 'good faith,' as used in paragraph 3, have a definite
and well-understood meaning, are free from ambiguity, and
their use in the act does not violate the due process clause
of the State or Federal Constitution. (Citing cases.) ''
[6] The phrase "good faith" in common usage has a
well-defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty
of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally
speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or obligation.
(See 18 Words and Phrases (perm. ed. 1940), p. 475 et seq.;
35 C.J.S. (1943), p. 488; Bouvier's Law Diet. (Rawle's
3d rev. 1914), p. 1359.)
[5b] We therefore hold that the words "good faith" as
used in Health and Safety Code, section 11330, have a definite
and well-understood meaning, are free from ambiguity, and
their use in the statutes does not violate the due process
clause of the federal Constitution.
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Defendant fnrth{~r contcnrls that tlw statutes of th{'
and Safety Code aw rmeonstitutionally applied in
1ha1 t lu~ insp<'etors from the State Bureau of Nareoties Bnrather than defendant, were allowed to determine
"·b·i ht:r or not defrndant acted ''in the reg11lar practicn of
]1is
" and in "good faith." This is not the ease.
The mu·cotie inspeetors testified to c(~rtain facts; defendant
testified to others. The determination of whether defendant
"in the l'(~gular practice of his profession" and in "good
faith" ·was left to the jury, ·which believed the facts were
as
to by the inspector, and that such facts did show
that defendant had not acted "in the regular practice of
his profession'' and in ''good faith.'
: That Health and Safety Code, srction 11164, is
because (1) the Legislature cannot depr£ve
a doc! or of the right to prescribe for any patient, including
one who may be an addict, and
the section leaves the
of who constitutes an addict to spem~lalion and con'fhi:s proposition is untenable. [8] ( l) 'J'he Legislature
has the po·wer to regulate the practice of a profes;;ion which
al'f\•ds the public health and safety. (Of. Hewitt v. State
Board of 1Ylcd1:cal E:x:aminers, 148 Cal. 590 at 592 !84 P. 39,
11:l Am.St.Hep. :H5, 7 Ann.Ca:s. 750, ;{ hRA.N.S. 896];
v. Ratledge, 172 CaL 401 at 405 [Hi6 P. 455].)
[9] (2) Addict is defined in section 11009 of the Health
and Safety Code as follows: " 'Addict,' as used in this
means a person who unlawfully uses, or is addicted
to the unlawful use of, nareotics." 'l'herefore, the question
of \rho constitutes an addict is not left to speeulation and
but is dearly and definitely defined by law.
[lOa] ]11 ifth: That defendant was trnlawfuUy entrapped.
'!'his contention is likewise without merit. 'fhe trial judge
and eompletely instructed the jury npon the law
Ielatiye io entrapment.
Ddendant elaims that th,• nareotie~ insp<'dor's ads in
a false name an(l address and tdling him he was
"1l" \\'er·e ill(·ga! aml that a c:onvi,:1 ion I'(~Sltlting from
IIre nse of ••videne,; secured by Rlleh ads is against pnbl ic:
pol
, vuid, and a ,lenial 1Jf t!J(' dw• J.ll'O(:<'Scl uf law.
lfr;:dllt and Safety Cod,·, sediu11s 11170 and] 1170.G, forbid
ally person to "obtain or attempt to obtain nareoiit:s (a) by
fraud. deceit, misrepresentation, or subtrrfuge; or (b) by
ihr concealment of a material fact," or to give a false

L
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name
narcotic.
Health and
authorized
of this division
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m connection with the

C.2d
of a

under
Yision or
al'e immune from "'"""'"'"
division.
Health and
sections
11170.5 and 11710,
are all in division 10 of such
as are sections 11163 and
a violation of which sections defendant was
guilty.
[11]
authorized peace
while investigating
violations of Health and Safety
sections 11163 and
11164, are immune from
for violating such sections. Since Shaw was
a narcotics inspector for the
State of California, and
was acting
to the orders
of his chief, ·walter Creighton, who told him to go to defendant's office and use the name "Joe Dillon" to see if defendant would write a prescription for narcotics for him, the
inspector was
engaged in enforcing the laws regulating
the prescribing of narcotics by investigating to see whether
or not defendant had l:l.n existing intention of ignoring the
laws forbidding his prescribing narcotics except under certain
specified circumstances, and was performing his official duties.
He was immune from prosecution while investigating violations of the provisions of sections 11170 and 11170.5 of the
Health and Safety Code. Thus, contrary to defendant's
contention, he was not violating any law and his acts were
not illegal when he gave a false name and address in attempting to buy narcotics from defendant. (See United States v.
Swift, 186 F. 1002 at 1017.) [12] Because the inspector was
immune from prosecution for the acts which he performed,
there is no merit in defendant's contention that he was an
accomplice to the issuance of the prescriptions in violation
of Health and Safety
sections 11163 and 11164, as an
accomplice must be liable to prosecution for the identical
offense charged against the defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
Here the inspector was immune from such prosecution.
[13] Defendant urges certain language used in People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 at 472
P.2d 905), in support of his
contention that the People should not be permitted to use
the evidence obtained by the narcotics inspector because he
procured it by false representations. The language used in
the Cahan case had reference to the facts in such case and
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criminal intent
mind of the

372
instant case it is clear the
was
from the evidence that the criminal intent
in the mind of defendant and therefore the mere
\ras solicited
a
the crime
inference of an unlawful

Sixth: That the trial court

to

'instn1ctions
contention is devoid of merit. An examination of the
shows that the trial
and clearly
on each and every material issue and that
the instructions
by defendant and refused were
covered by instructions read
the
to the jnry
not
to the facts in the instant case.
and order
a new trial are each
C. J., Shenk,
concurred.

J., and

J.-I dissent.
agree that any law of the State of California perofficer to go about
a fictitious name and make
statements to induce a doctor to prescribe a narcotic or
JHC;\.H'ClLl<;:; that requires a
for a
and to mist1Jat he is such
Such conduct, whether
by
officer, or anyone else, violates sections 11170, 11170.5
and 11171 of the Health and Safety Code.
11170 of the Health and
Code provides as
folluws: ''
No person shall obtain or
to obtain
or procure or attempt to procure the administration
-rw"'"'''"'"+'"'" for narcotics,
by fraud, deceit, misrepor subterfuge; or (b) by the concealment of a
material fact . . . . (3) No person shall, for the purpose of
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obtaining
falsely assume the title of, or represent
himself to be [here follows a list of authorized persons] or
other authorized per·son . ... " (Emphasis added.)
Section 11170.5 of the Health and Safety Code says: "No
person shall, in connection with the prescribing, furnishing,
administering, or dispensing of a narcotic, give a false name
or false address.''
Section 11171 reads : ''No person shall obtain or possess
a prescription that does not comply with this division.'' (Emphasis added.)
It is plain from the foregoing that the officer violated every
one of these mandates of the Legislature. He obtained each
of the prescriptions involved in this case (a) by fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and subterfuge; and (b) he concealed a
material fact, namely his true identity.
He represented himself to be an authorized person, which
he was not.
He obtained and possessed prescriptions that did not comply
with the provisions of the Health and Safety Code. Thereafter he falsely had them filled in violation of section 11170
of the Health and Safety Code.
The Legislature clearly intended these sections to apply to
all persons.
False and fictitious use of one's name and misrepresentation
of one's character are fraud and deceit, which the statute
expressly forbids. Fraud vitiates everything. It nullifies
judgments obtained thereby.
If these statutes that expressly forbid any person to use
these means, are changed by judicial construction, to authorize an officer to obtain a prescription (a) by fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by concealment of a
material fact, or by giving a false name or address, or obtain
or possess a narcotic that does not comply with these provisions of the Health and Safety Code, then such sections,
if thus construed and applied, violate due process of law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That constitutional guarantee
provides for American standards for the administration of
justice and conduct consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice must lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions. (Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312, 316 [47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102];
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 [29 S.Ct. 14, 53
L.Ed. 97] ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323, 325, 326
[58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288]; Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
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S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422] ; Adamson v. California,
.S. 46, 53 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R.
obtaining of a prescription from a duly licensed doctor
means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation-in violation
of the express commands of the Legislature-is reprehensible,
and contrary to the conscience of mankind. This
court is not authorized to legislate that it is lawful or to
it judicially. If it does, then the statutes, as thus
violate the F'ourteenth Amendment to the Constiof the United States.
the knowing presentation of perjured testimony in a
prosecution amounts to the denial of due process of
law (Jlooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed.
791, 98 A.L.R. 406]), it should follow as a matter of course
that evidence obtained by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation should have the same effect.
'rhe purity of the courts belongs to the courts. (Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435 [53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 86
A.L.R. 249] ; People v. Cahan, 44 CaL2d 434 [282 P.2d 905]
an(l cases cited therein.)
\Yhen the officer in this case falsified his name and character he acted in an individual capacity, for the state did
not authorize him to act falsely and fraudulently and to violate the express provisions of the Health and Safety Code.
I3ut if we approve such conduct then we become a party to it.
'rh is the court cannot do, lest the citizen shall say, "If the
officer can falsify, why can't we?" Courts of justice must set
an example of truth and justice and equal application of the
law's mandates to officers and citizens alike, lest the bad
of one shall lead to misconduct of the other. Civilized
standards of due process guaranteed by the federal Constitution forbid this.
I do not think this court or any court sJwnld ratify, adopt
and approve s11ch lawless disregard of honesty, decency and
ihc express and plain provisions of the Health and Safety
Code as written and adopted by our lawmakers.
Por the foregoing reasons and those stated in my dissenting
opinion in People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 803 [264 P.2d
5211, I would reverse the judgment and grant defendant a
new trial
.\pJH:llaut 's petition for a relwarin~ was denied June 6,
HICJH. Carter·, ,T., \\·as of the opinion that the petition should
granted.

